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Abstract
While the topic of financial regulation has recently experienced a resurgence in interest, one
area that historically has received little attention and continues to exist in relative obscurity is the
application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Company Act”) to commodity pools,
as opposed to mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity funds. The purpose of this article is
to distinguish the boundary between an investment company, as that term is defined in the Com-
pany Act, and a commodity pool, as the term is used to refer to an investment pool not within
the auspices of the Company Act, not because of an exemption from the definition of investment
company, but because it either is fully outside the definition of investment company or satisfies one
of the exceptions (as opposed to exemptions) from the definition. An investment pool that trades
primarily or exclusively in securities, including many private equity funds, most hedge funds and
all mutual funds, is an investment company for purposes of the Company Act and, thus, must
comply with the provisions thereof (in the case of a mutual fund) or operate within the scope of
an exemption (in the case of a private equity fund or a hedge fund). Commodity pools, which
are investment pools that trade primarily or exclusively in commodity contracts (e.g., futures con-
tracts and options on futures contracts), that engage in no trading of securities, except for cash
management purposes, are outside the reach of the Company Act and are regulated exclusively by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as opposed to being subject to the authority of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, except with respect to the public registration of the offering
of interests in such pools under the Securities Act of 1933 (if suchinterests are publicly offered).
A commodity pool that trades in securities in addition to commodities contracts may, however,
fall within the realm of the Company Act and thus either be subject to the Company Act’s regula-
tions (which, for a variety of reasons, is impossible for a commodity pool) or comply with one of
the exemptions from regulation thereunder (which primarily include Section 3(c)(1) and Section
3(c)(7)). These exemptions, however, require the commodity pool to observe certain restrictions,
including those on the pool’s marketing activities (such as limiting the number of investors in the
pool or limiting the pool’s investors to wealthy individuals and entities), which can make them
unattractive to commodity pool operators. Recent financial events have resulted in the proposal
of various regulatory reforms, ranging from minor adjustments to the current structure to sweep-
ing overhauls of the financial regulatory regime. However, before considering such proposals for
reform, it is important to understand the current financial industry regulations as they now exist.
Unfortunately, an important element of the current regulatory structure, namely, the applicability
of the Company Act to commodity pools, has garnered little attention and there is little guidance in
legislation, regulation or the legal discourse on this. This article focuses specifically on the point
at which a commodity pool engages in the trading of securities such that it is an investment com-
pany under the Company Act. In response to this gap in the legal discourse, this article attempts
to address this topic, which is particularly important in light of recent market events and proposals
for regulatory change, by providing a complete and systematic explication of (i) the definition of
an investment company under the Company Act; (ii) the definition of a security under the Com-
pany Act (which is necessary to determine whether an investment pool is an investment company
under the definition of investment company); and (iii) the applicability of these definitions to the
activities of commodity pools.
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While the topic of financial regulation has recently experienced a 
resurgence in interest, one area that historically has received little 
attention and continues to exist in relative obscurity is the application 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Company Act”) to 
commodity pools, as opposed to mutual funds, hedge funds and 
private equity funds. The purpose of this article is to distinguish the 
boundary between an investment company, as that term is defined in 
the Company Act, and a commodity pool, as the term is used to refer 
to an investment pool not within the auspices of the Company Act, 
not because of an exemption from the definition of investment 
company, but because it either is fully outside the definition of 
investment company or satisfies one of the exceptions (as opposed to 
exemptions) from the definition. An investment pool that trades 
primarily or exclusively in securities, including many private equity 
funds, most hedge funds and all mutual funds, is an investment 
company for purposes of the Company Act and, thus, must comply 
with the provisions thereof (in the case of a mutual fund) or operate 
within the scope of an exemption (in the case of a private equity fund 
or a hedge fund). Commodity pools, which are investment pools that 
trade primarily or exclusively in commodity contracts (e.g., futures 
contracts and options on futures contracts), that engage in no trading 
of securities, except for cash management purposes, are outside the 
reach of the Company Act and are regulated exclusively by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as opposed to being 
subject to the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
except with respect to the public registration of the offering of 
interests in such pools under the Securities Act of 1933 (if such 
 * Brian Vito is a post-graduate research fellow at Harvard Law School and a practicing 
lawyer focusing on securities and commodities law, and the regulation of private 
investment funds. 
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interests are publicly offered). A commodity pool that trades in 
securities in addition to commodities contracts may, however, fall 
within the realm of the Company Act and thus either be subject to 
the Company Act’s regulations (which, for a variety of reasons, is 
impossible for a commodity pool) or comply with one of the 
exemptions from regulation thereunder (which primarily include 
Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7)). These exemptions, however, 
require the commodity pool to observe certain restrictions, including 
those on the pool’s marketing activities (such as limiting the number 
of investors in the pool or limiting the pool’s investors to wealthy 
individuals and entities), which can make them unattractive to 
commodity pool operators. 
Recent financial events have resulted in the proposal of various 
regulatory reforms, ranging from minor adjustments to the current 
structure to sweeping overhauls of the financial regulatory regime. 
However, before considering such proposals for reform, it is 
important to understand the current financial industry regulations as 
they now exist. Unfortunately, an important element of the current 
regulatory structure, namely, the applicability of the Company Act to 
commodity pools, has garnered little attention and there is little 
guidance in legislation, regulation or the legal discourse on this. This 
article focuses specifically on the point at which a commodity pool 
engages in the trading of securities such that it is an investment 
company under the Company Act. In response to this gap in the legal 
discourse, this article attempts to address this topic, which is 
particularly important in light of recent market events and proposals 
for regulatory change, by providing a complete and systematic 
explication of (i) the definition of an investment company under the 
Company Act; (ii) the definition of a security under the Company 
Act (which is necessary to determine whether an investment pool is 
an investment company under the definition of investment 
company); and (iii) the applicability of these definitions to the 
activities of commodity pools. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In light of recent financial market events, Congress and regulators 
including the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”), Department of 
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have discussed and proposed 
significant revisions to the regulation of the use of financial derivatives 
and those that trade these instruments, including investment pools such 
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as commodity pools. One element of the existing regulatory framework 
is the Investment Company Act of 19401
Little analysis exists of the location and application of this dividing 
line, which is often, in practice, difficult to find; in response, this article 
attempts to explicate the existing literature, which in many cases 
consists only of no-action letters issued by the SEC, and apply the extant 
rules to commodity pools. The question is particularly difficult with 
respect to commodity pools because, unlike a mutual fund or hedge fund 
that trades primarily or exclusively in securities (and thus is clearly 
within the scope of the Company Act, whether regulated as an 
investment company or operating under an exemption from such 
regulation), commodity pools that trade no securities are not investment 
companies. However, somewhere between a pure commodity pool that 
trades no securities and an investment pool that trades significantly in 
securities, lies a commodity pool that trades in some securities. This 
article addresses the question of when such a commodity pool crosses 
into the realm of the Company Act in an attempt to address the lack of 
significant existing analysis. Specifically with the renewed interest in 
regulating investment pools and the financial instruments they trade, this 
question deserves a full analysis that it has not previously received. 
 (the “Company Act”), which 
proscribes certain activities by investment pools that fall within its 
scope—including mutual funds—in an effort to limit risk-taking by 
investment pools offered to the general public. However, a significant 
gap exists in the securities and commodities-related legal discourse with 
respect to what constitutes an “investment company” under the 
Company Act or, in other words, when an investment pool either (i) 
must comply with the provisions of the Company Act or (ii) utilize an 
exemption from the definition of “investment company” in order not to 
comply with the full provisions of the Company Act. 
An “inadvertent investment company”2
 
 1. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -64. 
 is an entity that, while not a 
mutual fund or similar traditional investment pool, finds itself within the 
auspices of the Company Act because it either intentionally or 
unintentionally (i) engages primarily in the business of investing or 
trading in securities or (ii) engages in the business of investing or trading 
in securities and owns investment securities having a value exceeding 
 2. SEC v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 486 F.3d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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40% of the value of its total assets.3 While there are certain statutory 
exceptions to these two definitions of an investment company—any 
issuer, for example, that is primarily engaged “in a business or 
businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or 
trading in securities” is excluded from the definition of investment 
company4
While not a commodity pool, the situation in which the Tonopah 
Mining Company of Nevada (“Tonopah Mining”) found itself in 1941 
prefigures a question confronted by many commodity pool operators—
whether the SEC could consider their commodity pools to be investment 
companies, inadvertent or otherwise, and thus subject to the rules and 
regulations of the Company Act. Tonopah Mining began its existence in 
1901 as a mining business, but by 1941 its assets consisted “in large part 
of mining securities”
—the boundaries of the Company Act are unclear, particularly 
with regard to its application to the investment activities of 
nontraditional investment pools, including commodity pools. 
Additionally, the definition of “security” for purposes of the Company 
Act is similarly unclear, and will also be analyzed in this article, as such 
analysis is essential to any complete discussion of the applicability of 
the Company Act to an investment pool’s trading activities. 
5 and so it filed an application under Section 3(b)(2) 
of the Company Act with the SEC on December 4, 1941 “for an order or 
orders adjudging it to be excepted from the provisions of the said Act.”6 
The SEC granted Tonopah Mining a temporary exception from the 
provisions of the Company Act,7 which was then extended four times8 
before the SEC held a hearing on the application.9 The SEC extended 
the temporary exception twice more10 before reconvening the hearing11
 
 3. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1). 
 
 4. Id. § 3(b). 
 5. In re Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426, SEC File No. 812-241, 1947 WL 
26116, at *2 (July 21, 1947). 
 6. Release No. 337, Release No. IC - 337, 1942 WL 34584, SEC File No. 812-241 
(April 6, 1942). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id.; Release No. 444, Release No. IC - 444, 1943 WL 30301, SEC File No. 
812-241 (February 2, 1943); Release No. 474, Release No. IC - 474, 1943 WL 30324, 
SEC File No. 812-241 (March 31, 1943); Release No. 502, Release No. IC - 502, 1943 
WL 30347, SEC File No. 812-241 (June 2, 1943). 
 9. Release No. 514, Release No. IC - 514, 1943 WL 30358, SEC File No. 812-241 
(June 24, 1943). 
 10. See Release No. 529, Release No. IC - 529, 1943 WL 30373, SEC File No. 
812-241 (July 29, 1943); Release No. 559, Release No. IC - 559, 1943 WL 30403, SEC 
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and finally issuing a declaratory order, nearly six years after Tonopah 
Mining had initially filed its application under Section 3(b)(2) for 
exception from the Company Act.12
A commodity pool generally is considered to be an entity managed 
“for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery,”
 This delay perhaps was a result of, 
and the order itself exemplifies, the difficulty in determining the 
application of the Company Act at its boundaries to nontraditional 
issuers of securities, such as commodity pools. 
13
 
File No. 812-241 (October 1, 1943). 
 
including options contracts on commodity futures contracts. In other 
words, a commodity pool is a variation on the investment pool theme, a 
theme that also includes mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity 
funds, that specializes in the trading, or trades exclusively, in 
commodities contracts. Unlike these other forms of investment pools, 
which are entities organized primarily or exclusively for the trading of 
securities, and clearly within the scope of the Company Act, commodity 
pools often do not trade in securities and even less frequently trade in 
securities as a component of their primary trading strategies (as opposed 
to using securities for cash management). Those commodity pools that 
do not trade in securities clearly fall outside the Company Act’s 
definition of investment company and, therefore outside the scope of the 
Company Act’s regulatory reach. Some commodity pools, however, 
either do trade, desire to trade, or may potentially trade in securities 
(either for cash management purposes or as a component of their trading 
strategies), potentially subjecting themselves to the regulatory regime of 
the Company Act. However, at what point a commodity pool’s securities 
trading-related activity is sufficient to qualify it as an investment 
company under the Company Act is unclear. The Tonopah Mining order 
confronts this question and sets out a series of factors to be considered 
when answering this question. These factors are addressed in Part II of 
this paper. In addition to the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a 
permissible amount of trading in securities for a commodity pool, what 
financial instruments are considered by the SEC to be securities for 
purposes of the Company Act remains unclear. It is clear, however, that 
 11. Release No. 996, Release No. IC - 996, 1946 WL 24746, SEC File No. 812-241 
(December 26, 1946). 
 12. In re Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426, SEC File No. 812-241, 1947 WL 
25615 (July 22, 1947). 
 13. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(5). 
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there are differences, perhaps significant, between the scope of financial 
instruments considered to be securities for purposes of the Company Act 
as opposed to the Securities Act and Exchange Act. 
Part II of this paper, as noted, addresses the first of these two 
fundamental questions (or, in other words, the Tonopah Mining issue)—
namely, what level of trading in securities may an entity conduct before 
it falls within the reach of the Company Act’s definition of investment 
company. The focus of this section is on the application of the Company 
Act and its definition of investment company to the activities of a 
commodity pool as that commodity pool’s portfolio moves beyond the 
trading of only commodity futures contracts and options on commodity 
futures contracts and whether the additional activities place such 
commodity pool within the definition of investment company under the 
Company Act. Part III discusses the second of these two fundamental 
questions by considering what financial instruments are securities for the 
purpose of determining the level of permissible securities trading-related 
activity as discussed in Part II. While the status of a financial instrument 
as a security in many situations under federal securities laws is clear (or 
at least more clear than such financial instrument’s status under the 
Company Act), there are more than a few ambiguous cases; particularly 
so in the context of the Company Act because, in part and as will be 
discussed, Congress has not kept the Company Act’s definition of 
security in line with the definitions contained in the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act. Specifically, in addition to the uncertainty that surrounds 
certain financial instruments as to whether they are securities for the 
purposes of the federal securities laws in general, certain financial 
instruments that are, for the purposes of the federal securities laws other 
than the Company Act, established as securities or non-securities by law 
or regulation, do not have similar confirmations of status under the 
Company Act. 
Part IV suggests potential revisions to the current Company Act 
regulatory structure that would address the two fundamental issues 
covered in Parts II and III, in part by (i) defining more specifically the 
scope of being primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities 
and (ii) establishing the status of certain financial instruments as 
securities or non-securities for purposes of the Company Act. 
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE COMPANY ACT TO COMMODITY POOLS 
A. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY 
The most visible example of an investment company that is 
regulated and must be registered as such is the publicly offered mutual 
fund, which is nothing other than “a pool of assets consisting of 
securities belonging to the shareholders of the fund.”14 Falling squarely 
within the definitions of investment company because they are primarily 
engaged in the trading of securities and do not qualify for any of the 
available exceptions or exemptions from such categorization, mutual 
funds (which are a primary form of “registered investment company” or 
“RIC”) must register with the SEC under the Company Act as 
investment companies.  They must also abide by the many restrictions 
on management and investment activities faced by registered investment 
companies, including substantive corporate governance standards, the 
requirement of an independent board and regulations on their investment 
activities and capital structure,15
The Company Act provides three definitions of investment 
company, two of which may be applicable to an investment pool, a 
commodity pool or any other issuer of securities.
 and must register the issuance of their 
securities (the participation interests an investor in such mutual fund 
purchases) under the Securities Act. In addition to the registration 
requirements faced by mutual funds under the Company Act and 
regarding the issuance of their securities under the Securities Act, the 
investment adviser of a mutual fund must register with the SEC as a 
registered investment adviser (a “registered investment adviser” or 
“RIA”) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers 
Act”). 
16
 
 14. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
39 (10th ed. 2007); see Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1031, 1046 (9th 
Cir. 1982). 
 Under Section 
3(a)(1)(A) of the Company Act, “any issuer which is or holds itself out 
 15. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 14, at 60. 
 16. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), (C). Investment Company Act § 
3(a)(1)(B), which includes “any issuer which is engaged or proposes to engage in the 
business of issuing face-amount certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged 
in such business and has any such certificates outstanding”, is not applicable to the 
typical inadvertent investment company situation or commodity pools in general. 
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as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities”17 qualifies as 
an investment company. An entity that falls within the definition of 
investment company under Section 3(a)(1)(A) will be labeled a “Type 
A” investment company, meaning one that is “primarily engaged” in the 
trading of securities. Under Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Company Act, 
“any issuer which is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of 
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and 
owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value 
exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer’s total assets 
(exclusive of government securities and cash items) on an 
unconsolidated basis”18
Section 3(b) of the Company Act provides an exception to the 
broad language of the definition of the Type C investment company by 
stating that, notwithstanding Section 3(a)(1)(C), “any issuer primarily 
engaged, directly or through a wholly-owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, 
in a business or businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, 
owning, holding, or trading in securities” is not an investment 
company.
 is also an investment company, and will be 
labeled a “Type C” investment company, as an entity that (i) engages in 
the trading of securities and (ii) has a significant investment in 
investment securities. Unlike a Type A investment company, a Type C 
investment company need not be primarily engaged in the trading in 
securities. However, by being primarily engaged in a business other than 
that of trading in securities, it can avoid falling within the scope of the 
Type C definition of investment company. 
19
These definitions of both Type A and Type C investment 
companies, and the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) immediately 
raise questions regarding their substance that require an analysis of 
whether an entity, including a commodity pool, is an investment 
company of either type. First, both definitions of investment company 
use the term “security,” which is a defined term under the Company Act. 
 Thus, to expand on the definition of a Type C investment 
company already given, a Type C investment company is any entity that 
(i) engages in the trading of securities, (ii) has a significant investment 
in securities and (iii) is not primarily engaged in a business other than 
that of trading in securities. 
 
 17. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A). 
 18. Id. § 3(a)(1)(C). 
 19. Id. § 3(b)(1). 
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The definition of “security,” contained in Section 2(a)(36) is similar to 
the definition of security given by other federal securities laws, but there 
are some differences that will be discussed later. Second, the definition 
of the Type C investment company uses the term “investment 
securities,” as defined by Section 3(a)(2) of the Company Act. The 
nature of these two definitions will be the subject of Part III of this 
paper. 
The rest of this Part II addresses the remaining two questions raised 
by the definitions of both Type A and Type C investment companies and 
the exception from these definitions of investment company provided by 
Section 3(b)(1). First, the definition of the Type A investment company 
and the exception provided in Section 3(b)(1) from the definition of the 
Type C investment company use the phrase “being ‘primarily engaged’ 
in the business of trading in securities” or similar language. Second, the 
definition of the Type C investment company requires an analysis of the 
meaning of being engaged in the business of trading in securities, rather 
than being primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities—or, 
stated differently, where the demarcation between being engaged in the 
business of trading in securities and being primarily engaged in such 
business—and being primarily engaged in another business—lies. 
The reason for considerable concern as to whether a commodity 
pool falls within either definition of an investment company, an 
exception to the definition of an investment company, or an exemption 
from application of the Company Act stems from the significant 
consequences faced by an inadvertent investment company. If an 
inadvertent investment company does not (i) register as an investment 
company and (ii) comply with the regulations on an investment 
company’s investment activity, it operates illegally, thereby creating 
rescission rights for investors, making all of its contracts voidable, and 
potentially subjecting its operator to criminal penalties.20
 
 20. Id. § 7. 
 However, it is 
not feasible for a commodity pool to register as an investment company 
and comply with the Company Act’s substantive regulation of 
investment activity.  For example, as discussed in the next section, a 
commodity pool could not comply with the prohibition on investing in 
senior securities, such as futures contracts, because, for obvious reasons, 
a commodity pool that cannot trade in futures contracts is not a 
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commodity pool.21
B. COMMODITY POOLS 
  Thus, it is imperative that a commodity pool either 
maintain its operations outside the reach of the definitions of an 
investment company, comply with a valid exception from those 
definitions, or fall under an exemption from the application of the 
Company Act. 
A commodity pool is “the commodities industry’s equivalent to the 
securities industry’s mutual fund.”22 Generally, it is a limited liability 
company or a limited partnership that offers limited liability company 
membership interests or limited partnership interests, respectively, to 
investors and pools the assets of the investors to invest in commodities 
futures contracts and options on commodities futures contracts. The 
entity—the commodity pool itself—is operated by a commodity pool 
operator23 (a “CPO”) and managed by a commodity trading advisor24 (a 
“CTA”). Often, these two functions are performed by the same entity. 
The Commodity Exchange Act25
 
 21. Id. § 18; Dreyfus Strategic Investing & Dreyfus Strategic Income (pub. avail. 
June 22, 1987) (staff no-action letter response), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/seniorsecurities-bibliography.htm. 
 and the regulations promulgated by the 
 22. James G. Smith, A Securities Law Primer for Commodity Pool Operators, 1996 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281, 282. 
 23. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1a(5) (“[A]ny person engaged in a business that is of 
the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in 
connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or 
property, either directly or through capital contributions, the sale of stock or other forms 
of securities, or otherwise, for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future 
delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract market or derivatives transaction 
execution facility, except that the term does not include such persons not within the 
intent of the definition of the term as the Commission may specify by rule, regulation, 
or order.”). 
 24. See generally Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(6)(A) (“[A]ny person 
who (i) for compensation or profit, engages in the business of advising others, either 
directly or through publications, writings, or electronic media, as to the value of or the 
advisability of trading in (I) any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery 
made or to be made on or subject to the rules of a contract market or derivatives 
transaction execution facility; (II) any commodity option authorized under section 6c of 
this title; or (III) any leverage transaction authorized under section 23 of this title; or (ii) 
for compensation or profit, and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning any of the activities referred to in clause (i).”). 
 25. Id. §§ 1-27. 
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CFTC thereunder regulate the activity of CPOs and CTAs, but do not 
regulate the activity of a commodity pool itself. Uniquely, while the 
securities regulatory regime may subject the advisor of an investment 
pool to the Advisers Act, the commodities legislative and regulatory 
regime does not seek to regulate the activity of commodity pools 
themselves.  This also distinctly contrasts the securities regulatory 
regime that seeks to regulate directly the activity of an investment pool 
through the provisions of the Company Act 
Investors in a commodity pool generally provide their capital for 
investment purposes by purchasing interests in the commodity pool. 
These interests are securities under the federal securities laws,26 which 
subject their public offering to the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act.27 Many commodity pools offer their interests privately in 
reliance on the exemption from registration provided by Section 4(2) of 
the Securities Act28 and the nonexclusive safe harbor of Regulation D 
promulgated thereunder.29 Commodity pools may, however, offer their 
interests publicly30 by registering the issuance under the Securities Act 
or, while retaining a private offering, for purposes of privately offering 
interests to more than 499 investors31 or to obtain certain benefits under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (otherwise known as 
“ERISA”),32
 
 26. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010); SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 register the interests themselves (as opposed to the 
registration of the offering under the Securities Act) pursuant to Section 
 27. Securities Act § 5(a). 
 28. Id. § 4(2). 
 29. SEC General Rules and Regulations, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
230.508 (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Superfund Gold, L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (June 12, 
2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1433147/000095013708008437/c27204sv1.ht
m. 
 31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78l (2010). 
 32. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1998) (If a pool is unable to comply with the so-called “25% test” (where less 
than 25% of any class of the pool’s equity interests are owned by “benefit plan 
investors”) in order to avoid the application of ERISA to the pool and/or the pool’s 
manager, a pool may register its securities under the Exchange Act § 12(g), which 
eliminates the need for the manager to consider the percentage of the pool owned by 
“benefit plan investors.”). 
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12(g) of the Exchange Act.33
Commodity pools differ from hedge funds and private equity funds 
in that they generally do not need to rely on exemptions from the 
Company Act because traditional commodity pools do not trade in 
securities (or do so only on a limited basis for the purpose of cash 
management rather than as a component of their trading strategies), thus 
leaving them outside the scope of the definition of either a Type A or 
Type C investment company. Hedge funds and private equity funds, 
which generally trade in securities as a primary focus of their investment 
strategies, often rely on the exemption provided in Section 3(c)(1)
 
34 of 
the Company Act, which exempts investment pools that privately offer 
their securities and have no more than one hundred investors. They may 
also rely on the exemption provided by Section 3(c)(7)35
Nevertheless, registered investment companies, including mutual 
funds, and those investment pools that do fall within the scope of the 
Company Act but are unable to rely on either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 
3(c)(7) of the Company Act (or any of the other available exemptions), 
must follow the activity regulations prescribed by the Company Act and 
the regulations promulgated thereunder. As with hedge funds and private 
equity funds, the restrictions placed on the investment activities of 
registered investment companies would be onerous to the point of 
destroying the ability of a commodity pool to function as such. In other 
words, a commodity pool that registered as an investment company 
would not be a commodity pool.
 of the 
Company Act, which exempts commodity pools that privately offer their 
securities and have only qualified purchasers as investors. 
36
 
 33. Securities Exchange Act § 12(g). 
 
 34. Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1) (“Notwithstanding [the 
definitions of investment company], none of the following persons is an investment 
company within the meaning of this title: any issuer whose outstanding securities are 
beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and 
does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.”). 
 35. Id. § 3(c)(7)(A) (“Notwithstanding [the definitions of investment company], 
none of the following persons is an investment company within the meaning of this 
title: any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons 
who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is 
not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such 
securities.”). 
 36. The SEC has, however, recently accepted the registration statements of two 
commodity pools as registered investment companies, which not only seems contrary to 
the Company Act, but circumvents the CFTC’s regulatory regime with respect to these 
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The onerous nature of the activity restrictions stems from the 
prohibition on non-exempt investment companies from issuing senior 
securities. The SEC generally views the activity of investing in futures 
contracts, including commodities futures contracts, as the issuance of 
senior securities.37
Certain commodity pools, however, (i) trade in securities for cash 
management purposes, (ii) trade in a de minimis amount of securities for 
hedging or diversification purposes or (iii) trade securities as a core 
element of their trading strategies. While such commodity pools may 
rely on the exemptions from the Company Act’s restrictions provided by 
Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7), many commodity pools instead 
would prefer to be excluded from the regulation of the Company Act by 
not falling under the definitions of Type A and Type C investment 
companies or, if they fall within the definition of Type C investment 
company, by relying on the exclusion provided by Section 3(b)(1) of the 
Company Act. 
 This stance significantly limits (but does not entirely 
restrict) the ability of registered investment companies to trade futures 
contracts and thus would render a commodity pool unable to function as 
a commodity pool. 
Commodity pools that run any risk of being investment companies 
prefer to be excluded from the definition of investment company or to 
rely on the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) of the Company Act, 
as opposed to relying on the exemptions of Section 3(c)(1) and Section 
3(c)(7) for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant of these 
reasons is the offering restrictions enforced by the Section 3(c)(1) and 
3(c)(7) exemptions. 
While most commodity pools are privately offered, those that do 
not rely on either Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act 
 
pools, which will be regulated as investment companies rather than commodity pools 
because registered investment companies are outside the CFTC’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., AQR Funds, Registration Statement (Form N-1A) (Dec. 17, 
2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1444822/000119312508255181/dn1aa.htm; 
The Frontier Fund, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2010), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1261379/000119312510018523/ds1.htm. 
 37. Investment Company Act § 18; Letter from Gerald T. Lins, Attorney, on behalf 
of Dreyfus Strategic Investing and Dreyfus Strategic Income to Mary Podesta, Chief 
Counsel, Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(Mar. 20, 1987), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/seniorsecurities-
bibliography.htm. 
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may be publicly offered, provided they comply with the provisions of 
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act38 (unlike hedge funds 
or private equity funds, which may never publicly offer their interests 
because of their reliance on the Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) 
exemptions).39 Such publicly offered commodity pools may solicit 
potential investors that do not meet any SEC or CFTC-imposed investor 
qualification standards (there may be some investor standards even for 
publicly offered commodity pools at the state level). Moreover, their 
method of solicitation may include advertising in ways that are 
prohibited by the private offering exemptions from the Securities Act. 
Privately offered commodity pools rely on the same Regulation D40 
nonexclusive safe harbor under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act41 to 
offer their interests privately as do other investment pools. Rule 506 of 
Regulation D42 exempts private offerings with up to 35 non-accredited 
investors and an unlimited amount of accredited investors43 from the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act.44 The Exchange Act, 
however, limits the sale of unregistered securities to no more than 499 
investors, but privately offered commodity pools, unlike hedge funds 
and private equity funds,45
 
 38. A commodity pool that is outside the scope of the Investment Company Act, 
and thus does not need to rely on either the section 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7) exemption 
from the provisions of the Company Act, is subject to no securities law requirement that 
it be privately offered; such commodity pool may, however, have to be privately offered 
to ensure compliance on the part of its commodity trading advisor and/or commodity 
pool operator with certain commodities laws or regulations if such party is relying on 
certain exemptions from CFTC regulations.  See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 4.7 (2010); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 4.13(a)(4) (2010). 
 may register their interests under the 
 39. Hedge funds and private equity funds, because they fall within the definition of 
investment company, may not publicly offer their interests (i.e., register the offering of 
their interests under the Securities Act) without having to register as investment 
companies, in which case they cease to be hedge funds or private equity funds and 
become mutual funds, with all the attendant restrictions faced by registered investment 
companies. 
 40. SEC General Rules and Regulations, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
230.508 (2010). 
 41. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2). 
 42. SEC General Rules and Regulations, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 
(2010). 
.Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (2010). 
 44. Id. § 230.506(a) (2010). 
 45. Hedge funds and private equity funds may register their securities under the 
Exchange Act, but generally do not do so because of the attendant reporting 
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Exchange Act and thus privately offer their interests to more than 499 
investors.46
In summary, commodity pools that are excluded from the definition 
of investment company may register the issuance of their securities 
under the Securities Act and thus publicly offer their securities, 
something investment pools relying on the exemptions provided by 
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Company Act may not do. Second, in 
addition to being prohibited from publicly offering their securities 
without registering as an investment company, investment pools that 
must rely on Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Company Act face 
restrictions on the number or nature of investors, respectively, that may 
purchase interests.
 
47 If an investment pool relies on the exemption 
provided by Section 3(c)(1) from the definition of investment company, 
rather than relying on being excluded from the definition of investment 
company or the exemption provided by Section 3(b)(1), it may have no 
more than 100 investors, a limit not faced by investment pools not 
relying on the Section 3(c)(1) exemption.48
 
requirements imposed by such registration on the entities (e.g., the requirement that 
such entities with securities registered under the Exchange Act file Forms 8-K, 10-Q 
and 10-K) and the reporting requirements imposed on their investors, meaning holders 
of securities registered under the Exchange Act (e.g., Forms 3, 4 and 5). These 
requirements are generally of less concern to commodity pools and their investors. 
 If an investment pool must 
rely on the exemption provided by Section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act, 
because it is not excluded from the definition of investment company 
 46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l(g)(1) (West 2004). 
 47. Company Act § 3(c)(1) limits its exemption to “[a]ny issuer whose outstanding 
securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one 
hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a 
public offering of its securities . . . .” Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-
3(c)(1). The Company Act § 3(c)(7) exemption is limited to “[a]ny issuer, the 
outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of 
acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and 
does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities.” A qualified 
purchaser generally is a natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in 
investments or any other person who in the aggregate owns and invests, on a 
discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000 in investments.  Investment Company Act 
§ 2(a)(51). 
 48. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(1).  When not relying on a particular 
exemption limiting an offering, an issuer may have up to 499 investors before it must 
register the securities under 15 U.S.C. 78l(g) (and thereafter may have an unlimited 
number of investors). 
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and cannot rely on the exclusion or exemption provided by Section 
3(b)(1) or Section 3(c)(1), respectively, then it must limit its investors to 
only qualified purchasers,49 which is a more limiting requirement than 
the Regulation D requirement that private offering be generally limited 
to accredited investors.50
While privately offered commodity pools generally rely on the 
exemption from registration under the Securities Act provided by 
Regulation D, which limits investors to no more than 35 non-accredited 
investors and an unlimited number of accredited investors,
 
51 investment 
pools relying on the Section 3(c)(7) exemption from the Company Act’s 
requirements are limited to accepting only qualified purchasers as 
investors.52 The definition of accredited investor includes any entity with 
total assets in excess of $5,000,000, any natural person with net or joint 
net worth with that natural person’s spouse in excess of $1,000,000, and 
any natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 
in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s 
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years.53 The definition of 
qualified purchaser, however, includes all accredited investors, but many 
(if not most or all) accredited investors are not qualified purchasers.54 In 
order to be a qualified purchaser, an investor must be an entity that owns 
at least $25,000,000 in investments or a natural person who, individually 
or with that person’s spouse, owns at least $5,000,000 in investments.55
 
 49. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7). 
 
Thus, the test for whether an investor is a qualified purchaser not only 
considers invested assets, rather than net assets, as with the test for 
accredited investors, but also requires significantly larger amounts 
invested than the net asset requirements of the accredited investor 
standard. 
 50. Unlike a qualified purchaser, an accredited investor for purposes of Regulation 
D is generally a natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that 
person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000, or who had an 
individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years, or joint 
income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years, and has 
a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year, or any 
other person with total assets in excess of $5,000,000.  SEC General Rules and 
Regulations, Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010). 
 51. Id. § 230.506(b)(2),230.501(e)(1)iv). 
 52. Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7)(A). 
 53. § 230.501(a). 
 54. § 230.501(a); Investment Company Act § 2(a)(51). 
 55. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(51). 
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Due to the material differences between the accredited investor and 
qualified purchaser standards, commodity pool operators generally 
would prefer not to have to rely on the Section 3(c)(7) exemption for 
two reasons.  First, the exemption’s qualified purchaser requirement 
restricts the commodity pool to a smaller portion of the total available 
investors. Second, the qualified purchaser requirement complicates both 
solicitation of investors and compliance. 
If a commodity pool relies on the Section 3(c)(1) exemption, it 
would not have to limit itself to only qualified purchasers.  However, 
because the offering would have to be private to comply with Section 
3(c)(1), the commodity pool still would have to limit itself to allowing 
only accredited investors if it utilizes the Regulation D private offering 
safe harbor.  Nevertheless, it is limited to no more than 100 investors.56
Commodity pools, if they do not engage in the trading of securities, 
do not fall within the scope of the Company Act’s Type A or Type C 
definitions of investment company.
 
57 Even those commodity pools that 
trade securities generally are not “primarily engaged” in the trading of 
securities, so they need not overly concern themselves with being 
considered Type A investment companies. However, the definition of 
“primarily engaged” is ambiguous, and will be explored in the next 
section of this paper. On the other hand, commodity pools that trade 
securities, even relatively small amounts of securities, must concern 
themselves with being considered Type C investment companies 
because a Type C investment company need only engage in the trading 
of securities and have a significant investment in investment securities.58
 
 56. Id. § 3(c)(1). 
 
A commodity pool that otherwise would qualify as a Type C investment 
company may rely on the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) of the 
Company Act, which excepts from the definition of  investment 
company an entity that, regardless of its level of trading in securities, is 
primarily engaged in a business other than that of trading in securities. 
Because of the Section 3(b)(1) exception, an entity’s status as a Type C 
investment company also may involve a determination of whether that 
entity is “primarily engaged” in trading in securities. The next section of 
this paper focuses on whether an entity, particularly a commodity pool, 
is “primarily engaged” in trading in securities or a business other than 
 57. Id.  § 3(a)(1)(A), (C). 
 58. Id. § 3(a)(1)(C). 
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trading in securities. 
While a commodity pool that finds itself within the scope of the 
definition of Type A investment company may rely on the same 
exemptions from the Company Act’s rules and regulations that hedge 
funds and private equity funds rely upon, namely Sections 3(c)(1) and 
3(c)(7) of the Company Act, for the reasons already discussed, 
commodity pools would prefer to remain outside the scope of the 
definition of investment company so that they need not comply with the 
marketing restrictions imposed by those exemptions. Similarly, a 
commodity pool that falls under the definition of a Type C investment 
company because it is engaged in trading in securities and has a 
substantial investment in securities, but that does not primarily engage in 
a business other than trading in securities (the Section 3(b)(1) 
exception), may also rely on the Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions.  
However, for the same reasons already noted, such an entity would 
prefer not to have to do so. Thus, the question remains as to how a 
commodity pool operator determines that its commodity pool is not 
primarily engaged in trading in securities. 
C. APPLICATION 
1. Engaged and Primarily Engaged 
As discussed, a commodity pool that trades only financial 
instruments other than securities need not be concerned with the 
regulations of the Company Act because it is excluded from the 
definitions of investment company contained therein. However, which 
financial instruments qualify as securities for purposes of a commodity 
pool’s determination as to whether it trades securities—and thus may 
fall within the scope of the Company Act’s definition of investment 
company—is a complicated question. Significant variation exists within 
the financial instrument universe and which financial instruments 
qualify as securities for Company Act purposes does not necessarily 
align with status determinations made under the other federal securities 
laws. Which financial instruments are securities for Company Act 
purposes is the focus of Part III of this paper. The remainder of Part II 
discusses the available guidance as to whether a commodity pool 
primarily engages in trading in securities, a question of primary 
importance to commodity pools that trade securities. 
Commodity pools, whether they trade securities as a part of their 
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investment strategies or not, often hold certain securities for cash 
management purposes. Due to the leverage available to traders of 
commodity futures contracts and options on commodity futures 
contracts, only a portion of a commodity pool’s assets need be utilized 
in the trading and margining of their portfolio.59 For cash management 
purposes, commodity pools often hold U.S. government securities and 
cash items, which are excluded from the 40% test contained in the 
definition of a Type C investment company.60 The exact nature of U.S. 
government securities and cash items will be discussed in Part III, but it 
is important to note here that those commodity pools that (i) trade 
securities only for cash management purposes and (ii) restrict such 
trading of securities to U.S. government securities and cash items will 
not find themselves within the definition of a Type C investment 
company. For that matter, such a commodity pool also would not find 
itself within the definition of a Type A investment company because a 
commodity pool trading in only U.S. government securities and cash 
items for cash management purposes is unlikely to be considered 
primarily engaged in the trading of securities.61
A commodity pool that (i) only trades in securities for cash 
management purposes but (ii) uses securities other than U.S. 
government securities runs a significant risk of falling within the 
definition of a Type C investment company, notwithstanding the Section 
3(b)(1) exception. While such a commodity pool may not primarily 
engage in the trading of securities, and therefore is not a Type A 
investment company, 40% of such a commodity pool’s assets may be 
held as investment securities. Its total assets may fall within the 40% 
threshold because of the leverage inherent in the trading of commodity 
 
 
 59. The purchaser of a futures contract need not pay the value of the futures 
contract, but only must post a good-faith margin deposit, which provides the purchaser 
significant leverage (i.e., the ability to purchase a large position for only a fraction of its 
full value).  See, e.g., JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES § 2.4 
(7th ed. 2009). 
 60. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(C).  “‘Government security’ means any 
security issued or guaranteed as to principal or interest by the United States, or by a 
person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the Government 
of the United States by the Congress of the United States; or any certificate of deposit 
for any of the foregoing . . . .”  Id. § 2(a)(16). 
 61. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(C) requires that greater than 40% of the 
value of an entity’s total assets be securities, however government securities and cash 
items are excluded from the calculation. 
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futures contracts and options on commodity futures contracts and the 
exclusion of U.S. government securities and cash items from the 
denominator when making the calculation of the percent of a commodity 
pool’s total assets held as investment securities. The 40% figure is 
calculated by dividing the value of the commodity pool’s investment 
securities (securities other than U.S. government securities, securities 
issued by employees’ securities companies and securities of majority-
owned subsidiaries of the commodity pool that are not registered 
investment companies or investment companies relying upon Section 
3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Company Act)62 by the value of the commodity 
pool’s total assets minus the value of the commodity pool’s U.S. 
government securities and cash items.63
The remainder of this section will address the fundamental question 
of what securities trading activities a commodity pool may engage in 
without being “primarily engaged” in the trading of securities for 
purposes of the definition of a Type A investment company, or before it 
is no longer “primarily engaged” in a business other than that of trading 
in securities for purposes of the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) of 
the Company Act. Because a commodity pool that primarily engages in 
a business other than trading in securities likely cannot also primarily 
engage in trading in securities, these are essentially the same question, 
specifically—to what extent a commodity pool may trade in securities 
without being “primarily engaged” in the trading of securities. 
 While the specific values used 
in this calculation can vary, and the methods of calculation are the 
subject of the next section of this paper, a commodity pool significantly 
increases its risk of having to rely on the Section 3(b)(1) exemption by 
trading securities other than U.S. government securities for cash 
management purposes. 
The opinion of the SEC in the matter of Tonopah Mining was the 
first interpretive guidance as to the “primarily engaged” element of the 
definitions of investment company under the Company Act.64
 
 62. “As used in § 3(a)(1)(C) of the Company Act, ‘investment securities’ includes 
all securities except (A) Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees’ 
securities companies, and (C) securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries of the 
owner which are not (i) investment companies, and (ii) are not relying on the exception 
from the definition of investment company in paragraph (1) or (7) of [Section 3(c) of 
the Company Act].”  Investment Company Act § 3(a)(2). 
 In 
 63. Id. § 3(a)(1)(A), (C). 
 64. In re Tonopah Mining Co., 26 S.E.C. 426, SEC File No. 812-241, 1947 WL 
26116 (July 21, 1947). 
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response to Tonopah Mining’s application for an order under Section 
3(b)(2)65 of the Company Act “declaring it not to be an investment 
company within the meaning of the [Company] Act on the ground that it 
is primarily engaged” in a business other than the trading of securities, 
the SEC denied the order because the company failed to “establish that it 
is primarily engaged in a business other than that of investing, 
reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in securities.”66 The level of 
Tonopah Mining’s trading in securities was not in dispute—over 40% of 
the company’s assets, exclusive of U.S. government securities and cash 
items, were, at the time, held as investment securities.67 Its business was 
originally one of metal mining, thus placing Tonopah Mining squarely 
within the scope of the definition of a Type C investment company and 
making it a primary example of the “inadvertent investment company.” 
Rather than relying without further guidance on the Section 3(b)(1) 
exception for Type C investment companies that are primarily engaged 
in a business other than that of trading in securities, Tonopah Mining 
applied to the SEC under Section 3(b)(2) for an order specifically 
excepting it from the definition of a Type C investment company as 
being primarily engaged in a business other than that of trading in 
securities.68 Such an order also would have excluded Tonopah Mining 
from the scope of the definition of a Type A investment company 
because an entity that primarily engages in a business other than that of 
trading in securities cannot also, at the same time, primarily engage in 
the trading of securities.69
Tonopah Mining was “undoubtedly primarily engaged in the 
mining business directly and through majority-owned subsidiaries” in 
the early years of its existence. It “regarded its portfolio of investments 
as a so-called exploration fund for the purpose of exploring and 
 
 
 65. “Notwithstanding [Section 3(a)(1)(C)], none of the following persons is an 
investment company within the meaning of this title: . . . (2) Any issuer which the 
Commission, upon application by such issuer, finds and by order declares to be 
primarily engaged in a business other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, 
holding, or trading in securities either directly or (A) through majority-owned 
subsidiaries or (B) through controlled companies conducting similar types of 
businesses.”  Investment Company Act § 3(b)(2). 
 66. In re Tonopah, at *1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. In re Tonopah, 26 at *1; Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(b)(2), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2). 
 69. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A). 
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developing mining properties”70 rather than as an investment fund for 
investment purposes. By the time Tonopah Mining applied for the order 
under Section 3(b)(2) of the Company Act, however, the company and 
its subsidiaries had only one active mining property as part of their 
overall portfolio of investments.71 In analyzing the activities of Tonopah 
Mining and determining whether it was primarily engaged in a business 
other than trading in securities, the SEC took into consideration the 
company’s  (i) historical development; (ii) representations as to its 
business; (iii) the activities of its officers and directors; (iv) the nature of 
its assets; and (v) the sources of its income.72 These five factors are 
known collectively as the “Tonopah Factors” and may be expressed 
more generally as “the company’s history, the way the company 
represents itself to the investing public today, the activities of its officers 
and directors, the nature of its assets, and the sources of its income.”73 In 
its order, the SEC gave the most weight to the fourth and fifth factors, 
without necessarily stating that the nature of an entity’s assets and the 
sources of its income would be dispositive of the line of business (the 
trading in securities or otherwise) in which it engages.74
The SEC has, in the sixty years or so since the Tonopah Mining 
order, continued to look to the Tonopah Factors in no-action letters 
when asked to provide interpretive guidance as to whether an entity’s 
activities result in such entity being primarily engaged in the business of 
trading in securities.
 
75 The courts, too, have used the Tonopah Factors 
when faced with this question.76
 
 70. In re Tonopah, 1947 WL, at *2. 
 In the time since the Tonopah Mining 
order, the SEC has issued some guidance in the form of no-action letters 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at ** 2-6. 
 73. SEC v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 486 F.3d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 74. Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
77,231, 1996 WL 422672 (July 15, 1996). 
 75. See, e.g., Peavey Commodity Futures Fund I, II and III, SEC No-Action Letter, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77, 511, 1983 WL 28438 (June 2, 1983); Alpha-Delta Fund, 
SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,606, 1976 WL 9134 (May 4, 
1976); Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
77,231, 1996 WL 422672  (July 15, 1996); Ft. Tryon Futures Fund Ltd. P’ship, SEC 
No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,610, 1990 WL 286989 (Aug. 16, 
1990); E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28486 (July 22, 
1983). 
 76. See, e.g., Nat’l Presto, 486 F.3d 305; SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 
435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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regarding the application of the Tonopah Factors to commodity pools 
specifically, but has not necessarily provided concrete examples of the 
application of the Tonopah Factors to commodity pools. When 
reviewing the application of the Tonopah Factors to commodity pools, 
the SEC has stated that it “would consider of first importance the area of 
business in which the entity anticipates realization of the greatest gains 
and exposure to the largest risks of loss,” noting that the composition of 
a commodity pool’s assets and the sources of its income are “usually 
regarded as the most telling” as to whether it is primarily engaged in a 
business other than that of trading in securities.77 This application of the 
Tonopah Factors, which considers both a commodity pool’s stated 
intentions and its actual results, will be referred to as the “Peavey Test” 
because of its use in the Peavey Commodity Futures Funds no-action 
letters. It reflects the fact that “with respect to a commodity pool, a 
snapshot picture of its balance sheet contrasting the value of its future 
contracts (unrealized gain on such contracts) with the value of its other 
assets” may not necessarily “reveal the primary nature of the business”78 
because a commodity pool’s “reserves and margin deposits, which often 
are in the form of United States government notes, may not reveal the 
primary nature of the business.”79
In addition to the Peavey Test as an application of the Tonopah 
Factors, in a subsequent SEC no-action letter interpreting the Tonopah 
factors, the SEC stated that it has “recognized that a commodity pool’s 
balance sheet may not necessarily be a useful indicator of the pool’s 
primary business.”
 
80 As such, “the most important factor to be 
considered is the portion of the pool’s business with respect to which it 
anticipates realization of the greatest gains and exposure to the largest 
risk of loss.”81
 
 77. Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 The SEC, providing slightly more detail, noted that “a 
commodity pool’s primary business should be deemed to be investing or 
trading in commodity interests if (1) the pool looks primarily to 
commodity interests as its principal intended source of gains, (2) the 
pool anticipates that commodity interests present the primary risk of 
loss, and (3) the pool’s historical development, public representations of 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; Currency Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, WSB File No. 092986005, 1986 
WL 68339 (May 29, 1986). 
 80. Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 81. Id. 
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policy (in its prospectus or offering circular and in marketing materials), 
and the activities of those charged with management of the pool 
demonstrate that the pool’s primary business is investing or trading in 
commodity interests, rather than securities.”82, Thus, the fact that a 
commodity pool has more than 40% of its assets held as securities would 
not necessarily indicate that it primarily engages in the business of 
investing in securities.83
The disconnect between a commodity pool’s primary business 
activity and its balance sheet and assets stems from, as already 
discussed, the leverage inherent in commodity futures contracts and 
options on such contracts. Because of such leverage, much of a 
commodity pool’s assets are held as cash or in cash-like securities not 
for core investment strategy purposes, but for cash management 
purposes. Despite having stated that it “did not, nor did [it] intend to, 
imply that the investment of margin deposits in Treasury bills in order to 
earn income to offset brokerage and other costs will invariably result in 
investment company status, even if more than 50% of a company’s 
capital is devoted to such use, provided it can be demonstrated factually 
that the primary engagement of such company is in commodities 
activities,”
 
84 and that “a company’s real intentions may be revealed by 
its operations and, therefore, its gains and losses in futures trading, in 
comparison to its gains and losses on its government securities and other 
securities would be relevant to a determination of the company’s 
primary business,”85
So far, the interpretive guidance from the SEC regarding whether a 
commodity pool is primarily engaged in the business of trading in 
securities discussed has applied to commodity pools that trade some 
amount of securities, but has not analyzed any specific amount of 
securities trading activity. The SEC has issued three additional no-action 
letters
 the SEC has issued little guidance as to the specific 
or concrete application of this analysis to entities in general or 
commodity pools in particular. 
86
 
 82. Id. 
 discussing the application of the investment company 
definitions to commodity pools that provide some additional detail on 
the meaning of “primarily engaged” for the purpose of the Company 
 83. Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 84. Alpha-Delta, SEC No-Action Letter (emphasis added). 
 85. Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 86. Ft. Tryon Futures Fund, SEC No-Action Letter; Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC 
No-Action Letter; E. F. Hutton, SEC No-Action Letter. 
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Act. 
In a no-action letter issued to the Ft. Tryon Futures Fund Limited 
Partnership (“Ft. Tryon”) in 1990, the SEC stated that it would not 
recommend enforcement action against Ft. Tryon for investing up to 
25% of its assets in another commodity pool without registering itself as 
an investment company and subjecting itself to the Company Act 
regulations.87 This no-action letter illuminates a concrete percentage of 
trading in securities that a commodity pool may engage in without being 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities because limited 
partnership interests are securities for purposes of federal securities 
laws, including the Company Act.88 In reaching its decision, the SEC 
expressed its reliance on certain representations given by Ft. Tryon in its 
request for no-action relief, stating that it would not recommend 
enforcement action under the Company Act against Ft. Tryon.89 The 
representations given by Ft. Tryon in its request letter include that: (i) 
most of its assets would be used for commodities trading and thus 
exposed to the risks of commodities trading; (ii) the gains and losses 
from commodities trading were expected to exceed the gain or loss from 
the investment in the other commodity pools; (iii) the activities of the 
officers and employees of the commodity pool operator and/or 
commodity trading advisor were largely related to the commodity 
trading activities of Ft. Tryon; and (iv) Ft. Tryon’s sources of income 
were gains realized on the trading of its assets, including those assets 
used to margin its commodity trading accounts, interests on its assets 
and any increase in the value of the interests in the other commodity 
pools.90
 
 87. Ft. Tryon Futures Fund, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 These representations were given by Ft. Tryon in its request for 
no-action relief in response to the analysis the SEC used in its Peavey 
Commodity Futures Funds no-action letters, which was based primarily 
 88. The test of whether an interest is a security “is whether the scheme involves an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the 
efforts of others” or, in other words, there must be (i) an investment of money (ii) in a 
common enterprise with (iii) an expectation of profits to be derived (iv) solely from the 
efforts of others.  SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).  Each of these 
four elements has significant jurisprudence behind it, but the details are beyond the 
scope of this article.  For an introduction, see, e.g., THERESA A. GABALON & LARRY D. 
SONDERQUIST, SECURITIES LAW, CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS SERIES (3rd ed. 2007). 
 89. Ft. Tryon Futures Fund, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 90. Id. 
150 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
on the SEC’s analysis in its Tonopah Mining order.91
Unfortunately, a later SEC no-action letter issued to the Managed 
Futures Association (the “MFA Letter”)
 
92 has since called into question 
any clarity provided by the Ft. Tyron letter. While limited partnership 
interests93 for federal securities laws94 are generally regarded clearly as 
securities, even when the limited partnership interests are issued by an 
investment pool,95 in the MFA Letter, the SEC stated that it would not 
recommend enforcement action under the Company Act against a 
commodity pool that does not register as an investment company, 
despite investing more than 40% of its assets in the interests of other 
commodity pools.96 The SEC was willing to provide this relief in 
reliance on the exception provided in Section 3(b)(1) of the Company 
Act. It based this relief on its determination that such a commodity pool 
would be primarily engaged not in the business of trading in securities, 
but in the business of trading in commodity interests, by “‘look[ing] 
through’ the second-tier pools in which [the commodity pool] has 
invested and treat[ing] the business activities of each second-tier pool as 
having been engaged in directly by the commodity pool itself.”97
While the Ft. Tryon letter stands for the proposition that a 
commodity pool may invest up to 25% of its assets in securities without 
being primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities, the 
MFA Letter stands for the proposition that a commodity pool that 
invests its assets in other commodity pools may treat its interests in 
those other commodity pools as commodity interests, rather than 
securities, by looking through the investee commodity pools to their 
activities trading in commodity interests. Therefore, the MFA Letter 
essentially challenges the interpretation that Ft. Tryon was investing in 
securities and, therefore, permitted commodity pools a 25% allocation to 
securities without being primarily engaged in the business of trading in 
securities. The MFA Letter forces consideration of the possibility that 
the SEC, in the Ft. Tryon letter, may not have viewed the commodity 
pool interests in which Ft. Tryon invested as securities. Rather, it may 
 
 
 91. Ft. Tryon Fund, SEC Request Letter (July 2, 1990). 
 92. Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 93. As well as membership interests in limited liability companies, but not, 
however, general partnership interests.  Howey, 328 U.S.  at 293. 
 94. Namely, in addition to the Company Act, the Securities Act and Exchange Act. 
 95. Howey, 328 U.S.  at 293. 
 96. Managed Futures Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 97. Id. 
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have looked through to the activity of the investee commodity pools 
because the SEC did not explicitly state in the Ft. Tryon letter that it 
viewed the commodity pool interests as securities. The Ft. Tryon letter 
may no longer stand (if it ever did) for the position that a commodity 
pool may invest up to 25% of its assets in securities without being 
primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities. Rather, it 
may stand for the proposition that a commodity pool may invest up to 
25% of its assets in the interests of another commodity pool without 
being primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities. If that 
is the case, then the Ft. Tryon letter provides no independent guidance 
other than that given by the MFA Letter. 
So while the Ft. Tryon letter may provide some comfort (or prior to 
the MFA Letter may have provided some comfort) that a commodity 
pool that invests up to 25% of its assets in securities is not primarily 
engaged in the business of trading in securities, in light of the MFA 
Letter, a commodity pool operator in analyzing the activity of its 
commodity pool for purposes of the Company Act’s definition of 
investment company should be cautious of relying too heavily on the Ft. 
Tryon letter’s guidance. Some years prior to the issuance of the Ft. 
Tryon letter, the SEC responded to a no-action request by E.F. Hutton 
and Company Inc. (“E.F. Hutton”) that proposed to invest up to 33% of 
a commodity pool’s assets in securities.98 The SEC’s response to this 
inquiry, however, declined to take a no-action position, instead referring 
E.F. Hutton to the Peavey Commodity Futures Fund no-action letters 
and the Tonopah Factors. Thus a commodity pool may invest up to 33% 
of its assets in securities and satisfy the Peavey Test that it is not 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities, but the E.F. 
Hutton letter itself provides little interpretive guidance.99
The available guidance on the acceptable level of securities trading 
in which a commodity pool may engage in without primarily engaging 
 
 
 98. E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28486 (July 22, 
1983). 
 99. In referring E.F. Hutton to the Peavey Commodity Futures Fund no-action 
letters, the SEC stated that a commodity pool’s “investment in equity securities should 
be added to whatever other investments in securities other than futures contracts on 
securities and options on such futures the pool has made or contemplates making, and 
the income and gains or losses on such investments should be added to the income and 
gains or losses on the pool’s investments in securities other than futures contracts on 
securities and options on such futures.” Id. 
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in the business of trading in securities leaves much to be desired; merely 
stating that the analysis involves consideration of the composition of a 
commodity pool’s assets and the sources of its income, focusing on “the 
area of business in which the entity anticipates realization of the greatest 
gains and exposure to the largest risk of loss,”100 and less importantly, 
the activities of its employees, its representations as to its business and 
its historical development.101 Thus, the Tonopah Factors together with 
the Peavey Test suggest that the inquiry as to whether a commodity pool 
is primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities is one that 
requires a fact-intensive analysis of a variety of elements specific to an 
individual commodity pool. Yet, available guidance does not provide 
specific details as to how a commodity pool operator should apply the 
Tonopah Factors or the Peavey Test. Specifically, there are two primary 
elements of the application of the Tonopah Factors and the Peavey Test: 
(i) the method for determining the composition of a commodity pool’s 
assets and the sources of its income (and the actual determination 
according to such method); and (ii) the amount of a commodity pool’s 
assets that may be allocated to securities before such commodity pool 
loses its ability to rely on the Section 3(b)(1) exemption that it is not 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities.102  The Ft. 
Tryon and E.F. Hutton letters may clarify item (ii) of the inquiry,103
A commodity pool that trades in securities must consider the 
inadvertent investment company fate of Tonopah Mining. Any 
commodity pool that trades in securities—more specifically, engages or 
proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, 
holding or trading in securities
 but 
neither provides much comfort. Item (i) is the subject of the next section 
of this paper. 
104
 
 100. Peavey Commodity Futures Fund I, II and III, SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77, 511, 1983 WL 28438 (June 2, 1983). 
—and has 40% or more of its assets 
held as investment securities (other than U.S. government securities and 
cash items), may fall within the definition of a Type C investment 
company. While such a commodity pool may rely on the exemptions 
provided by Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Company Act, relying on 
 101. In re Tonopah, 26 S.E.C. 426, SEC File No. 812-241, 1947 WL 26116 (July 
21, 1947); Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 102. In re Tonopah, 26 S.E.C. 426; Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 103. Ft. Tryon Futures Fund, SEC No-Action Letter; E. F. Hutton, SEC No-Action 
Letter. 
 104. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C). 
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the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) is preferable for a variety of 
reasons.  Under the Section 3(b)(1) exception, such commodity pool 
must primarily engage in a business other than that of trading in 
securities. 
Determining whether a commodity pool that trades in securities 
primarily engages in a business other than trading in securities requires 
the uncertain application of the Tonopah Factors and the Peavey Test. 
Unfortunately, ambiguity surrounds both the method for calculating a 
commodity pool’s securities-related activity and the amount of 
securities-related activity permissible before a commodity pool loses its 
ability to rely on the Section 3(b)(1) exception. Making the analysis 
even more complex, the 40% test for purposes of Section 3(a)(1)(C) of 
the Company Act is distinct from the test for whether the amount of a 
commodity pool’s assets held as securities precludes reliance on the 
Section 3(b)(1) exception; it is possible for a commodity pool to fail the 
40% test (i.e., have more than 40% of its total assets, exclusive of U.S. 
government securities and cash items, held as investment securities) but 
by the Tonopah Factors and the Peavey Test, not be primarily engaged 
in the business of trading in securities. Also, the specific percentages 
given in the Ft. Tryon and E.F. Hutton letters have more applicability to 
the determination of whether a commodity pool falls within the 
definition of a Type A investment company because a commodity pool 
that fails the 40% test is unlikely to meet the percentages given by these 
two letters. It remains unclear, however, what, if any, current guidance 
these two letters provide as to what level of activity constitutes primary 
engagement in the business of trading in securities. 
While the SEC has stated that it considers the composition of a 
commodity pool’s assets and the sources of its income of primary 
importance, that is not to say such considerations are dispositive.105 The 
SEC may consider all of the Tonopah Factors when determining whether 
a commodity pool primarily engages in the business of trading in 
securities.106
 
 105. Peavey, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 The SEC may consider whether, for example, the 
employees of a commodity pool’s commodity pool operator spend a 
disproportionate amount of time analyzing or trading in securities, 
negotiating securities trading arrangements or over the counter securities 
products or designing systems related to the trading of securities, even if 
 106. Id. 
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the trading of securities represents a small amount of the commodity 
pool’s activities. Also, the SEC may consider whether a commodity pool 
operator represents a commodity pool to potential investors as a 
securities-related investment by looking at marketing materials and 
annual reports. Finally, the SEC may consider whether a commodity 
pool has historically acted as a commodity pool or as another form of 
investment pool (or, as with Tonopah Mining, an entirely different type 
of entity). 
Ultimately, perhaps the best guidance available to a commodity 
pool operator when trying to interpret the applicability of the Company 
Act to a commodity pool is that the term “primarily engaged” must be 
used in a reasonable manner. When considering the Tonopah Factors 
and the Peavey Test, any result that strains the reading of “primarily 
engaged” to the point of making the term “primarily” lose any 
semblance of meaning (and thus cease to differentiate “engaged” from 
“primarily engaged”) is likely incorrect. Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the 
Company Act uses the term “engaged” while Sections 3(a)(1)(A) and 
3(b)(1) use the term “primarily engaged”; it would be nonsensical for 
these terms to be synonymous, thus requiring some added level of 
activity to differentiate “primarily engaged” from “engaged.” 
“Primarily” generally means “mostly,” or at least more than a de 
minimis amount. As such, if 10%, or up to 20%, of a commodity pool’s 
assets are allocated to trading in securities, it is unlikely that this activity 
would qualify as a primary engagement in the business of trading in 
securities. However, the SEC has not, through any interpretive guidance 
other than that contained in the Ft. Tryon and E.F. Hutton letters, stated 
that this amount of trading in securities or any other amount of trading in 
securities is clearly not within the scope of the term “primarily 
engaged.” 
2. Calculating Assets and Sources of Income 
The SEC has stated that it considers the composition of a 
commodity pool’s assets and the sources of its income, focusing on “the 
area of business in which the entity anticipates realization of the greatest 
gains and exposure to the largest risk of loss” to be of primary 
importance.107
 
 107. Id. 
 However, it has not discussed how to calculate either the 
composition of a commodity pool’s assets or the primary sources of its 
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income. With regard to the determination of the composition of a 
commodity pool’s assets, interests in commodity futures contracts and 
options on commodity futures contracts tend to present more difficult 
valuation questions than securities. Derivatives are financial instruments 
that derive their value from other underlying financial instruments108 and 
include futures contracts and options on futures contracts.109 They not 
only have more complicated valuation procedures,110 but because of the 
embedded leverage involved in these instruments they have three 
different measures of value—the amount margined for the positions, the 
notional principal amount (or notional value) of the positions and the 
fair market value of the positions. Margin requirements are a small 
portion of the notional value and generally range from approximately 
5% to 15% of the notional value of these contracts, allowing a 
commodity pool to command significant positions in commodity futures 
contacts and options on commodity futures contracts on commodities 
markets111
When calculating the composition of a commodity pool’s assets, 
the balance sheet snapshot approach would overemphasize the 
commodity pool’s allocation to securities, but using the notional 
principal amounts of commodities contracts would likely overstate the 
 without significant capital outlays. As a result, the balance 
sheet of commodity pools, when looked at from a capital allocation 
perspective, are often highly skewed toward securities ownership 
because the capital not used for margining commodities positions 
(which may make up a large portion of the commodity pool’s total 
assets) is frequently held in cash-like securities for cash management 
purposes. 
 
 108. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 14 , at 334. 
 109. Futures contracts, which are standardized, exchange-traded forward contracts, 
derive their values from the values of the underlying assets, and options on futures 
contracts derive their values from the values of the underlying futures contracts, among 
other considerations.  See, e.g., Hull, supra note 61, ch. 1. 
 110. Options valuation involves a variety of components, and a number of differing 
valuation methods have emerged in addition to the original Black-Scholes model.  See, 
e.g., FRANCESCA TAYLOR, MASTERING DERIVATIVES MARKETS (3d ed. 2007); see also 
HULL, supra note 61, ch. 1. 
 111. For example, the designated contract markets (“DCMs”) Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (“CME”), Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”), New York Mercantile 
Exchange (“NYMEX”), Commodity Exchange (“COMEX”) and ICE Futures US 
(formerly New York Board of Trade, or “NYBOT”). 
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value of those interests.112 The SEC has provided no guidance on the 
method for calculating the composition of a commodity pool’s assets—
in other words, whether such calculation should be determined using 
values on a gross or net basis—nor has it provided guidance for the 
methods to be used for calculating the value of individual assets.113 The 
other of the two most important Tonopah Factors is the sources of a 
commodity pool’s income that present the greatest possibility for gain 
and exposure to the largest risk of loss. Ambiguity exists here too, as 
with the valuation of a commodity pool’s assets. There are various ways 
in which to calculate a commodity pool’s risk of loss, each of which 
could lead to a differing result as to which investments present a 
commodity pool with the greatest risk of loss.114
The Tonopah Factors and the Peavey Test, while providing general 
guidance for commodity pool operators, lack concrete guidance as to 
their application to specific commodity pools. In addition, it is possible 
for a commodity pool, under the Tonopah Factors and the Peavey Test, 
to look, ex ante, like it primarily engages in a business other than that of 
trading in securities, yet ex post, derives significant profits from the 
trading of securities, even if such a scenario may be unlikely or highly 
unlikely given the commodity pool’s trading strategy and asset 
allocation (e.g., by suffering large losses on its commodities positions 
while experiencing large gains on its cash management securities 
positions). In addition to the uncertainty regarding what constitutes 
being primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities, 
uncertainty exists as to which financial instruments are considered to be 
securities for the purpose of the Company Act. Part III of this paper 
addresses this inquiry. 
 Similarly, there are 
various ways to calculate the potential for gain—and a commodity 
pool’s expectation may not match reality. 
 
 112. The Bank for International Settlements estimates the outstanding notional value 
of over-the-counter derivatives contracts at $604 trillion as of June 2009, compared to a 
gross market value of $25 trillion as of the same date.  Bank of International 
Settlements, Monetary and Economic Dept., (Nov. 2009), OTC Derivatives Market 
Activity in the First Half of 2009, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
otc_hy0911.pdf?noframes=1. 
 113. Options on futures contracts, for example, may be valued in a variety of 
different ways, with the most common being the Black–Scholes method; nonetheless, 
there are alternative valuation models. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 113, at 52. 
 114. For example, Value at Risk (“VaR”) is a common method of estimating the risk 
of loss, but there are other possible measures, including Expected Shortfall; see, e.g., 
HULL, supra note 61, ch. 20. 
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III. DEFINING “SECURITY” FOR COMPANY ACT PURPOSES 
A. “SECURITY” IN GENERAL 
Both the Securities Act115 and the Exchange Act116 define 
“security.” Although the definitions are functionally identical in many 
ways, there are a few differences. The most significant difference is the 
Exchange Act’s exclusion from its definition of security of “currency or 
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a 
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive 
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is 
likewise limited.”117
 
115 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010) (“The term ‘security’ 
means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, 
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, 
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or 
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt 
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing.”). 
 Both definitions begin with a list of specific 
 116. Commodity Exchange Act § 3(a)(10). (“The term ‘security’ means any note, 
stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty 
or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for 
a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of 
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the 
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national 
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security’; or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of 
exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not 
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity 
of which is likewise limited.”). 
 117. Id.  The following is a full comparison showing the differences from the 
Securities Act definition to the Exchange Act definition (underlined text is added in the 
Exchange Act; struck-through text is deleted in the Exchange Act): “The term ‘security’ 
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financial instruments and broader terms such as “investment contract” 
and conclude with a general inclusion of any instrument “commonly 
known as a ‘security,’”118 with the intention “to include within the 
definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial world 
fall within the ordinary concept of a security.”119 The primary test for 
what financial instruments qualify as “investment contracts” was given 
by the Supreme Court in the 1946 Howey decision,120 which stated that 
an “investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of 
the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in 
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal 
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.”121
Analyzing a financial instrument under (i) the specific list of items 
given in the federal securities laws’ definitions of securities and, if not 
enumerated therein, (ii) the Howey case’s analysis of whether such 
financial instrument falls within the scope of “investment contract” is 
the general scheme for determining whether a financial instrument is a 
security for purposes of the federal securities laws. The definition 
contained in the Company Act is significantly similar. However, there 
are important differences in the ultimate result of the application of the 
various definitions.
 
122
 
means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, or 
in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest 
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any 
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest 
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’,; or any certificate 
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee 
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.; but shall not 
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has 
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of 
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.” 
 
 118. Securities Act § 2(a)(1); Id. § 3(a)(10). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 85, at 11 (1933). 
 120. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 293 (1946). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36).  The 
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B. “COMMODITY” IN GENERAL 
The Commodity Exchange Act defines the term “commodity” and 
includes “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future 
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”123 Many financial 
instruments may be easily classified as either a security or commodity 
for purposes of these definitions. Many of those classified as securities 
(e.g., exchange-traded stocks) are rarely traded by commodity pools 
(which generally trade cash-like securities). However, in determining 
whether certain financial instruments, often traded by commodity pools, 
are securities for purposes of the Company Act, the meaning of the term 
“security future” plays an important role and is included within the 
scope of each definition of security in the Company Act, Securities Act 
and Exchange Act and is defined in the Exchange Act.124
 
following is a full comparison showing the differences from the Securities Act 
definition to the Company Act definition (underlined text is added in the Company 
Act): Security “means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for 
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, 
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, (including a certificate of deposit,) or on 
any group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national 
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”  Id. 
 
 123. Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(4).  “The term ‘commodity’ means wheat, 
cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, 
Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, 
tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed 
meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and 
frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, except onions as 
provided in [Public Law 85-839 (U.S.C. 13-1)], and all services, rights, and interests in 
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”  Id. 
 124. Id. § 3(a)(55)(A).  “The terms ‘security future’, ‘narrow-based security index’, 
and ‘security futures product’ have the same meanings as provided in section 3(a)(55) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.” Securities Act § 2(a)(16). “The term ‘security 
future’ means a contract of sale for future delivery of a single security or of a narrow-
based security index, including any interest therein or based on the value thereof, except 
an exempted security under subsection (a)(12) as in effect on [January 11, 1983 (other 
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A security future is generally a contract of sale for future delivery 
of a single security or of a narrow-based security index, except an 
exempted security.125 Congress established this definition in the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000126 (the “CFMA”), which 
legalized futures contracts on single securities and narrow-based stock 
indices.127 These financial instruments had, since the so-called Shad-
Johnson Accord128 that was a negotiated jurisdictional compromise 
between the SEC and the CFTC, been illegal;129 with the passage of the 
CFMA, Congress granted joint regulatory jurisdiction to the SEC and 
the CFTC over security futures.130 Futures contracts on broad-based 
securities indices, which are not security futures and thus not securities 
for federal securities laws purposes, were left solely within the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC.131 Congress added security futures 
to the definitions of “security” contained in the Securities Act, Exchange 
Act and Company Act (although the Securities Act and Company Act 
simply refer to the definition contained in the Exchange Act.)132
By redefining certain futures contracts that otherwise would have 
fallen within the definition of commodity as security futures (and thus 
securities and within the SEC’s jurisdiction), Congress left the 
regulation of those contracts (including futures contracts and options on 
futures contracts on commodities) that fall under the definition of 
“commodity” and trade on exchanges regulated by the CFTC within the 
CFTC’s regulatory authority. These financial instruments, which include 
futures on broad-based stock indices, are not securities for federal 
securities laws purposes, including the Company Act. As with 
exchange-traded stocks (clearly securities) and futures on broad-based 
 
 
than any municipal security as defined in subsection (a)(29) as in effect on January 11, 
1983)]. The term ‘security future’ does not include any agreement, contract, or 
transaction excluded from the Commodity Exchange Act under section 2(c), 2(d), 2(f), 
or 2(g) of Title 7 (as in effect on December 21, 2000) or title IV of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000.”  Id. 
 125. Id. § 3(a)(55). 
 126. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 127. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 14, at 21-22, 47-50. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 2(a)(52), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(52). “The 
terms ‘security future’ and ‘narrow-based security index’ have the same meanings as 
provided in section 39(a)(55) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”  Id. 
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stock indices or commodities (clearly non-securities), many financial 
instruments are either clearly securities or clearly non-securities for all 
federal securities laws purposes. However, as will be discussed in the 
remainder of Part III, there are some differences regarding which 
financial instruments are considered securities for Company Act 
purposes and those which are considered securities under the Securities 
Act and Exchange Act. 
C. “SECURITY” IN THE COMPANY ACT 
The definition of “security” contained in the Company Act is 
substantively similar to that of the Exchange Act and materially identical 
to that of the Securities Act.133 The first of the two primary differences 
between the Company Act’s definition of “security” and that of the 
Exchange Act is the concept of exempted securities,134 which under the 
Exchange Act includes government securities.135 The Company Act does 
not qualify its definition of “security” with any financial instruments that 
are exempt from such definition. As a result, debt instruments, 
regardless of their issuer, are securities for purposes of the Company 
Act, whereas under the Exchange Act, debt instruments issued by certain 
government issuers are considered exempted securities.136
 
 133. Id. § 2(a)(36). “‘Security’ means any note, stock, treasury stock, security 
future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or 
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate 
of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificate of 
deposit) or on any group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based 
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a 
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant 
or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”  Id. 
 Debt 
 134. Exchange Act § 3(a)(12). 
 135. Id.§ 3(a)(12)(A)(i). 
 136. The definition of “exempt securities” exempts “such other securities (which 
may include, among others, unregistered securities, the market in which is 
predominantly intrastate) as the Commission may, by such rules and regulations as it 
deems consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors, either 
unconditionally or upon specified terms and conditions or for stated periods, exempt 
from the operation of any one or more provisions of this title which by their terms do 
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instruments issued by the government of the United States,137 as well as 
many other nations,138 qualify as exempt securities under the Exchange 
Act, but are securities for purposes of the Company Act. However, the 
Company Act, which includes “security futures” in its definition of 
security,139 takes its definition of security futures from the Exchange 
Act.140 This leads to the anomalous, and perhaps unintentional, result 
that, for Company Act purposes, futures on these debt instruments are 
not security futures—and thus not securities (unlike the debt instruments 
themselves).141 Under the definition of security future in the Exchange 
Act, which includes futures on single securities, a future on a single debt 
instrument is a future on a single security (a debt instrument being a 
security),142 thus making the future a security future. The Exchange Act, 
however, exempts these government-issued debt instruments from its 
definition of security (unlike the Company Act, under which such 
government-issued debt instruments are securities), so futures on these 
certain government-issued debt instruments are not futures on a single 
security, and thus not security futures or securities for Company Act 
purposes.143
The second of the two primary differences between the definitions 
of “security” contained in the Securities Act and Exchange Act and the 
Company Act relates to the regulation of swap contracts.
 
144
 
not apply to an ‘exempted security’ or to ‘exempted securities’.”  Id. § 3(a)(12)(A)(vii). 
 In addition 
to exempting certain securities from the definition of “security” for 
 137. Under the Exchange Act, the definition of “exempt securities” exempts 
“government securities” and the term “government securities” is defined to include 
“securities which are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to principal or 
interest by, the United States.” Id. § 3(a)(42)(A). 
 138. Debt securities issued by the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, 
France, New Zealand, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Belgium, and 
Sweden are exempt.  See e.g., supra note 135. 
 139. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36). 
 140. Id. § 2(a)(52); Exchange Act § 3(a)(55). 
 141. The debt instruments themselves would be securities.  Id. § 2(a)(36); SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946). 
 142. Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36). 
 143. Exchange Act § 3(a)(55); Investment Company Act § 2(a)(52),(36). 
 144. A swap “is a contract between two parties (usually called the counterparties) 
under which they agree to exchange a series of cash flows over time.”  COFFEE ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 334.  A swap may, in some situations, be, in economic function, 
analyzed as a combination of two forward contracts.  See, e.g., HULL, supra note 61, ch. 
7. 
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purposes of the Exchange Act (and, by the Company Act’s incorporation 
of the Exchange Act’s definition of security future, from qualifying as 
security futures and thus securities under the Company Act), the 
Exchange Act also exempts swap contracts from its definition of 
“security.”145 While the Securities Act does not contain a definition of 
“exempt securities,” it too exempts swap contracts from its definition of 
security.146 The CFMA added those exemptions147 and took “security-
based swap agreements” and “non-security based swap agreements” out 
of the definitions of “security” for purposes of the Securities Act and 
Exchange Act. The definitions of “security-based swap agreements” and 
“non-security based swap agreements” together “cover the waterfront 
and exempt all swap agreements” 148 from being considered “securities” 
under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Security-based swap 
agreements are swap agreements “of which a material term is based on 
the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index 
of securities, or any interest therein,”149
 
 145. Exchange Act § 3A. 
 but unlike security futures, are 
 146. Securities Act § 2A. 
 147. Commodity Futures Modernization Act §§ 301-04. 
 148. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 14, at 335. 
 149. Non-security based swap agreements are “any swap agreement . . . that is not a 
security-based swap agreement.”  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 206C (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. 78c (1934)).  A ”swap agreement” is “any agreement, contract, or 
transaction . . . that (1) is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind for 
the purchase or sale of, or based on the value of one or more interest or other rates, 
currencies, commodities, indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic 
interest or property of any kind; (2) provides for any purchase, sale, payment or 
delivery (other than a dividend on an equity security) that is dependent on the 
occurrence, non-occurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency 
associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence; (3) 
provides on an executory basis for the exchange, on a fixed or contingent basis, of one 
or more payments based on the value or level of one or more interest or other rates, 
currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative 
measures, or other financial or economic interests or property of any kind, or any 
interest therein or based on the value thereof, and that transfers, as between the parties 
to the transaction, in whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change 
in any such value or level without also conveying a current or future direct or indirect 
ownership interest in an asset (including any enterprise or investment pool) or liability 
that incorporates the financial risk so transferred, including any such agreement, 
contract, or transaction commonly known as an interest rate swap, including a rate 
floor, rate cap, rate collar, cross-currency rate swap, basis swap, currency swap, equity 
index swap, equity swap, debt index swap, debt swap, credit spread, credit default swap, 
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not themselves securities under the Securities Act or the Exchange 
Act.150 “Security-based swap agreement” status under the Company Act, 
however, remains unclear because Congress did not similarly amend the 
Company Act by the CFMA to exempt swap contracts from the 
definition of “security” contained in the Company Act. The SEC has not 
provided any guidance as to whether it considers swap contracts to be 
securities under the Company Act’s definition. However, the fact that 
Congress added the exclusion of swap contracts from the definitions of 
securities under the Securities Act and Exchange Act at the same time as 
it amended the definitions of securities under the Securities Act, 
Exchange Act and Company Act to include security futures,151
While the definition of both Type A and Type C investment 
company use the term “security,” the definition of Type C investment 
company also uses the terms “government security” and “investment 
security.”
 suggests 
that Congress intended swap contracts to remain (or at least potentially 
remain, subject to SEC rulemaking) within the definition of “security” 
for Company Act purposes. A plausible means of analyzing swap 
contracts for the purpose of the Company Act’s definition of “security” 
(as opposed to considering all swap contracts to be securities for 
Company Act purposes) is contained in the next section of this paper. 
152 The term “government security” is defined, primarily, as 
“any security issued or guaranteed as to principal or interest by the 
United States”153
 
credit swap, weather swap, or commodity swap; (4) provides for the purchase or sale, 
on a fixed or contingent basis, of any commodity, currency, instrument, interest, right, 
service, good, article, or property of any kind; or (5) is any combination or permutation 
of, or option on, any agreement, contract, or transaction described in any of paragraphs 
(1) through (4).”  Id.§ 206A. 
 and “investment security” is defined as “all securities 
except (A) Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees’ 
 150. Exchange Act § 3A.  “The definition of ‘security’ in section 2(a)(1) of this title 
does not include any non-security-based swap agreement [or] any security-based swap 
agreement.” Securities Act § 2A. “The definition of ‘security’ in section 3(a)(10) of this 
title does not include any non-security-based swap agreement [or] any security-based 
swap agreement.”  Id. 
 151. The addition of the swap exemptions and the addition of the definitions of 
security future (and the addition of the term security future to the definitions of 
security) were all done by Congress simultaneously by way of the CFMA. 
 See Commodity Futures Modernization Act (codified as amended at H.R. 
5660 (2000)). 
 152. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a)(1)(C). 
 153. Id. § 2(a)(16). 
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securities companies, and (C) securities issued by majority-owned 
subsidiaries of the owner which (i) are not investment companies, and 
(ii) are not relying on the exemption from the definition of investment 
company” provided in [Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)].154
D. TRADING OF AMBIGUOUS INSTRUMENTS BY COMMODITY POOLS 
 The definitions of 
these two terms both incorporate the definition of security and are 
necessary for the determination of an investment pool’s status as an 
investment company; however, they generally present less ambiguity 
and difficulty than the general definition of security for purposes of the 
Company Act because the field of potential securities issued by the U.S. 
government is limited to those financial instruments that generally fall 
clearly within the scope of securities. When calculating the 40% test, 
“investment securities” will include those items determined to be 
“securities” (where the difficulty lies—that is, one must first answer the 
question whether a financial instrument is a security before one can 
reach the question whether it is an investment security) except for 
certain clearly-delineated financial instruments. 
1. Swap Contracts 
Congress, by not exempting swap contracts from the Company 
Act’s definition of security when it exempted swap contracts from the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act definitions of security, left significant 
ambiguity as to whether swap contracts qualify as securities for 
Company Act purposes. Treating swap contracts as securities for 
Company Act purposes would result in an odd difference in treatment 
from their treatment under other federal securities laws.  However, it is 
difficult to imagine Congress not aware of this result when it amended 
the Securities Act, Exchange Act and Company Act by the CFMA. As 
such, despite the difference in treatment, it seems likely Congress did 
not want all swap contracts exempted from the definition of security for 
Company Act purposes (unlike for Securities Act and Exchange Act 
purposes). This, however, does not necessarily imply that Congress 
intended for all swap contracts to qualify as securities under the 
Company Act. 
Congress may have intended for swap contracts, under the 
 
 154. Id. § 3(a)(2). 
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Company Act, to be analyzed under the “security future” rubric, 
meaning treated as if they were futures on underlying instruments rather 
than swap contracts on underlying instruments. However, if a future on 
an underlying financial instrument were a security future (and thus a 
security under the Company Act), a swap contract on such underlying 
financial instrument would be treated as a security under the Company 
Act. Thus, while a swap contract on a (i) commodity, (ii) futures 
contract on a commodity, (iii) futures contract on a commodity-based 
index or (iv) futures contract on a broad-based securities index (i.e., a 
non-security) would be a non-security for Company Act purposes, a 
swap on a (i) single security or (ii) narrow-based securities index would 
be a security for Company Act purposes. Although this approach tracks 
the approach Congress took with regard to security futures and may be a 
valid means of determining whether a swap is a security for Company 
Act purposes, significant ambiguity remains with respect to the 
treatment of swap contracts under the Company Act without guidance 
from either Congress or the SEC. 
2. Currency Forward Contracts 
Congress explicitly excluded currency from the definition of 
security in the Exchange Act,155 but did not do so in the definition of 
security in either the Securities Act156 or the Company Act.157 This 
differing treatment at least leads to some ambiguity as to whether 
currency is to be considered a security for the purposes of either the 
Securities Act or the Company Act. Also, while futures on currency are 
not security futures, including for the Company Act because the 
Company Act takes its definition of a security future from the Exchange 
Act, the status of over the counter forward contracts on currencies is at 
best ambiguous because the SEC has declined to take a position with 
respect to this type of financial instrument.158 In the Currency Fund no-
action letter, the SEC staff advised that it would not be willing to 
recommend not taking enforcement action against an investment pool 
for not registering under the Company Act.159
 
 155. Exchange Act § 3(a)(10). 
 The investment pool in 
 156. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 157. Company Act § 2(a)(36). 
 158. Currency Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, WSB File No. 092986005, 1986 WL 
68339 (May 29, 1986). 
 159. Id. 
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question proposed to invest half of its assets in a subsidiary that would 
then invest substantially all of its assets in over the counter currency 
forwards. However, the SEC would not agree that currency forwards 
were not securities under the Company Act and provided no analysis in 
declining to issue the no-action relief.160
IV. REVISING THE CURRENT REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
 Thus, as it is with swap 
contracts, whether currency forward contracts are securities under the 
Company Act remains unclear. The commodity pool industry generally 
treats currency forward contracts as non-securities and futures contracts 
on currencies are not securities; this may be a reasonable position, but 
there is no assurance that the SEC will not eventually take a contrary 
position. 
A. DEFINING “PRIMARILY ENGAGED” 
Congress or the SEC could provide significant clarity for those 
entities, including commodity pools, that run a risk of qualifying as an 
inadvertent investment companies by specifically defining a threshold 
for “primary engagement” that would clearly delineate the difference 
between being engaged in the business of trading in securities and being 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities. In addition, 
Congress or the SEC could further clarify the issue by setting out with 
specificity the method by which an investment pool’s activity should be 
quantified and, ultimately, determined as being primarily engaged in the 
business of trading in securities or not. The Tonopah Factors and Peavey 
Test notwithstanding, significant ambiguity exists as to where the line 
between being engaged in the business of trading in securities and being 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities lies. 
Unfortunately, the Ft. Tryon and E.F. Hutton letters provide little 
additional guidance on the matter and fail to define for commodity pool 
operators a specific amount of trading in securities that their commodity 
 
 160. The entire text of the SEC’s response is as follows: “The determinative issue 
raised by your letter of February 27, 1986, is whether a ‘forward currency contract’ or 
‘foreign currency contract’ is a security for purposes of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (‘Act’). On the basis of the facts and representations contained in your letter, we 
are unable to concur with your view that they are not. Therefore, we are unable to 
assure you that we would not recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if 
the Currency Fund proceeds without registering under the Act.”  Id. 
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pools may engage in without falling within the definition of Type A 
investment company. Similarly, none of the Tonopah Factors, Peavey 
Test or the Ft. Tryon or E.F. Hutton letters shed significant light on 
when a commodity pool can rely on the Section 3(b)(1) exception—that 
is, the exception for entities that are primarily engaged in a business 
other than that of trading in securities—or provide a framework that 
commodity pool operators may readily apply. 
This paper proposes a non-exclusive safe harbor approach to the 
clarification of being “primarily engaged” in the business of trading in 
securities for purposes of the Company Act. Much as Regulation D 
provides a non-exclusive safe harbor for private offerings under Section 
4(2) of the Securities Act, the SEC could adopt regulations detailing a 
method by which commodity pools could ensure their being primarily 
engaged in a business other than that of trading in securities, and by 
doing so, would not fall under the Type A definition or Type C 
definition of investment company. The non-exclusivity of the proposed 
safe harbor would guarantee that a commodity pool that is unable to 
comply with the provisions therein could rely on a Tonopah Factors or 
Peavey Test analysis to conclude that it is not primarily engaged in the 
business of trading in securities, just as an issuer that is unable to, or 
accidentally does not, comply with, the rules of Regulation D may rely 
on the general exemption of “transactions by an issuer not involving any 
public offering” contained in the Securities Act itself.161 The SEC has, in 
fact, already taken a similar approach with respect to the Type C 
definition of investment company.162 Company Act Rule 3a-1 (“Certain 
Prima Facie Investment Companies”) exempts certain entities, 
notwithstanding the definition of investment company contained in 
Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Company Act, from the Type C definition of 
investment company—specifically, those entities that hold no more than 
45% of their assets (exclusive of U.S. government securities and cash 
items) as securities and derive no more than 45% of their net income 
from securities.163
 
 161. Securities Act § 4(2). 
 Thus, a commodity pool that engages in securities 
 162. Company Act Rule 3a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-1. 
 163. Id.: “Notwithstanding section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Act, an issuer will be deemed 
not to be an investment company under the Act; Provided, That: (a) No more than 45 
percent of the value (as defined in section 2(a)(41) of the Act) of such issuer’s total 
assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) consists of, and no more 
than 45 percent of such issuer’s net income after taxes (for the last four fiscal quarters 
combined) is derived from, securities other than: (1) Government securities; (2) 
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trading, but holds less than or equal to 45% of its assets as securities and 
derives less than or equal to 45% of its net income from these securities, 
despite holding more than 40% of its assets as securities, will not be 
considered a Type C investment company.164 This Rule 3a-1, however, 
does not address what it means to be primarily engaged in the trading of 
securities for the purpose of the Type A definition of investment 
company and states that a qualification for an entity’s reliance on its 
exemption is that the entity not otherwise be an investment company 
(i.e., be “primarily engaged” in the business of trading in securities).165
Because at the time of the Ft. Tryon letter the SEC presumably 
seemed comfortable with a commodity pool allocating 25% of its assets 
to trading in securities, perhaps this should be a starting point for the 
discussion of a non-exclusive safe-harbor interpretation of “primary 
engagement” by the SEC. From this starting point, because the SEC 
declined to take a position in the E.F. Hutton letter, it seems the SEC 
would, at least in some situations, be comfortable with a finding that a 
commodity pool investing up to one-third of its assets in securities does 
not primarily engage in the business of trading in securities. From a 
general perspective too, a commodity pool that has 33% of its assets 
invested in securities hardly seems to be “primarily engaged” in the 
business of trading in securities; once the allocation reaches more than 
50%, however, it certainly seems reasonable to interpret that commodity 
 
Additionally, because of the difficulties in determining the percentage of 
a commodity pool’s assets held as securities and whether it derives less 
than or equal to 45% of its net income from securities, Rule 3a-1 is not a 
particularly helpful safe harbor for commodity pools. 
 
Securities issued by employees’ securities companies; (3) Securities issued by majority-
owned subsidiaries of the issuer (other than subsidiaries relying on the exclusion from 
the definition of investment company in section 3(b)(3) or section 3(c)(1) of the Act) 
which are not investment companies; and (4) Securities issued by companies: (i) Which 
are controlled primarily by such issuer; (ii) Through which such issuer engages in a 
business other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in 
securities; and (iii) Which are not investment companies; (b) The issuer is not an 
investment company as defined in section 3(a)(1)(A) or 3(a)(1)(B) of the Act and is not 
a special situation investment company; and (c) The percentages described in paragraph 
(a) of this section are determined on an unconsolidated basis, except that the issuer shall 
consolidate its financial statements with the financial statements of any wholly-owned 
subsidiaries.” 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. § 270.3a-1(b). 
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pool as being primarily engaged (simply based on the general use of the 
term “primarily”) in the trading of securities and thus falling within the 
definition of Type A investment company (and falling within the 
definition of Type C investment company without being able to rely on 
the Section 3(b)(1) exemption from the Type C investment company 
definition because it would likely fail the 40% test contained in the 
definition of Type C investment company, and not be able to argue 
reasonably that it is not primarily engaged in the business of trading in 
securities). Indeed, The SEC received a request for a no-action position 
with regard to a commodity pool that proposed to invest up to 50% of its 
assets in other commodity pools (before the MFA letter, so at the time it 
would seem the SEC would have viewed this investment as being in 
securities), which was withdrawn without the SEC issuing a response, 
probably because the SEC indicated it would not be able to recommend 
that no enforcement action would be taken.166
Notably, if a commodity pool with a portfolio allocation of 40% to 
securities were unable to be primarily engaged in the business of trading 
in securities—or, in other words, if such an allocation conclusively 
resulted in the commodity pool being primarily engaged in the business 
of trading in securities—the Section 3(b)(1) exception from the 
definition of Type C investment company would be rendered useless. 
Similarly, if it were impossible for a commodity pool that holds no more 
than 45% of its assets as securities and derives no more than 45% of its 
net income from trading in securities, the exemption provided in 
Company Act Rule 3a-1 would lose its function as an exemption 
because it does not apply to entities that are primarily engaged in the 
business of trading in securities.
 
167
 
 166. In Re Futures Portfolio Fund, L.P., SEC Request Letter (Mar. 13, 1990). 
 Presumably Congress, when it 
enacted the Company Act, expected Section 3(b)(1) to have a function, 
meaning to be able to except an entity that has a 40% allocation 
(exclusive of government securities) of its portfolio to investment 
securities from being subject to the Company Act’s definitions of 
investment company. Therefore there must be a situation where a 
commodity pool that falls within the definition of Type C investment 
company because of its 40% allocation (exclusive of government 
securities) to investment securities can be primarily engaged in a 
business other than that of trading in securities. From this line of 
reasoning, which applies similarly to the percentages provided by the 
 167. 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-1(b). 
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SEC in Company Act Rule 3a-1, it would seem a commodity pool that 
trades securities as 40% or more of its portfolio (at least up to 45%) 
must have an opportunity not to be a Type C investment company, 
which should be reflected in any safe harbor regulations. Therefore this 
paper proposes that the non-exclusive safe harbor allow a commodity 
pool (or any other entity) an allocation to securities trading of up to—but 
not including—50%, but allowing an allocation of up to 60% for up to a 
period of two months out of any given year to allow for unplanned or 
unusual variation. This proposed safe harbor would supersede the 
current exemption provided by Company Act Rule 3a-1, which would 
unify the definitions for being primarily engaged in the business of 
trading in securities between the Type A and Type C definitions of 
investment company and would remove the current 45% limit on income 
attributable to securities by entities wishing to avail themselves of Rule 
3a-1. The difficulty in calculating potential income makes this proposed 
safe harbor desirable; if the recent market events have taught us 
anything, it is that market events are unpredictable. 
Under this proposed safe harbor, the calculation of risk allocation, 
one of the difficulties of the Tonopah Factors and Peavey Test, becomes 
unnecessary. However, the question of how to calculate a commodity 
pool’s allocation to securities trading for the 50% (and 60%) limit 
remains of significant importance (under the proposed safe harbor, the 
only element of the test for primary engagement being asset allocation). 
Commodity pools, as already discussed, will have a significant 
allocation of their assets to highly leveraged financial instruments—
including financial instruments that are not available in an unleveraged 
form, such as futures contracts on commodities, and options on futures 
contracts on commodities. Such an allocation makes calculating an 
overall or total asset allocation difficult because only a portion of 
available assets are used to margin the leveraged positions that have a 
much larger notional value. For leveraged financial instruments, rather 
than using the initial or ongoing margin requirements (which would be 
reflected on the balance sheet) or the full notional value (which, 
especially for swap contracts, may significantly over-value the 
transaction), this paper suggests the use of the close-out value of the 
transactions, as calculated pursuant to the terms of the contract 
governing the financial instrument. For example, the close-out value of 
an exchange-traded security is the latest bid price on that security on the 
exchange where it is traded; similarly, the close-out value of an 
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exchange-traded futures contract is the latest bid price on that futures 
contract on the exchange where it is traded (which is the notional value 
of the contract). However, for over the counter transactions, including 
swap contracts, the notional value is not necessarily the same as the 
close-out price, but the close-out price more accurately reflects the 
actual value of the contract to the parties. This method attempts 
accurately to reflect, with respect to commodity pools, the significant 
risk/return and asset allocation to the trading of non-securities. These 
characteristics, which stem from any inherent leverage, are significantly 
more likely to guide the returns (or losses) of commodity pools than the 
pools allocations to securities, which are likely to be less leveraged or 
unleveraged. 
Ultimately, with respect to whether a commodity pool is an 
investment company under the definitions of investment company in the 
Company Act, the inquiry involves two analytic steps: (i) is the 
commodity pool primarily engaged in the business of trading in 
securities or (ii) does the commodity pool hold a significant portion of 
its assets as securities while not being primarily engaged in a business 
other than that of trading in securities (i.e., while being primarily 
engaged in the business of trading in securities). The Tonopah Factors 
and the Peavey Test provide some guidance as to what constitutes being 
primarily engaged in the business of trading in securities, but they are 
both fact-intensive and situation-specific inquiries, and the SEC has not 
provided much guidance in the way of how to apply the Tonopah 
Factors or the Peavey Test. To address this uncertainty, the SEC could 
adopt a non-exclusive safe harbor stating that a commodity pool that 
invests less than 50%, while still allowing for some periodic variation of 
its assets in securities using the close-out values of all its positions, 
would be primarily engaged in a business other than that of trading in 
securities. Such a safe harbor would assure such commodity pools that 
they would not be inadvertent investment companies under either the 
Type A investment company or Type C investment company definition. 
B. DEFINING “SECURITY” 
1. Futures on Exempted Government Debt Instruments 
While not necessarily an ambiguity in the definition of security 
itself for purposes of the Company Act, because of the Company Act’s 
use of the Exchange Act’s definition of security future, which in turn 
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incorporates the exemptions from the definition of security under the 
Exchange Act, including the exemption for U.S. government securities 
and debt instruments issued by certain other governments, under the 
Company Act these financial instruments themselves are securities 
(unlike under the Exchange Act). Futures on these financial instruments, 
however, are not security futures, and thus not securities for purposes of 
the Company Act. It is unclear whether this was Congress’ intended 
result when it added security futures to the definition of security in the 
Security Act. The SEC has not taken a position on whether it would 
view futures on debt instruments issued by these exempted governments 
as security futures (and therefore securities) under the Company Act, but 
it seems unlikely that it could do so without contradicting the plain 
definitions of the terms; nonetheless, the SEC may wish to consider 
taking a position for the sake of clarity. 
2. Swap Contracts 
Congress could address the current ambiguity regarding whether 
swap contracts should qualify as securities under the Company Act’s 
definition of security by adding an equivalent of Section 2A of the 
Securities Act or Section 3A of the Exchange Act to the Company Act. 
By doing so, Congress would exempt swap contracts from the definition 
of “security” for purposes of the Company Act in the same way it 
exempted swap contracts from the definition of security for purposes of 
the Securities Act and Exchange Act. This would be the ideal result 
from the perspective of commodity pools. Similarly, from the 
perspective of the unification of standards and definitions under the 
federal securities laws, swap contracts should be treated similarly under 
each of the major federal securities laws. That the federal securities laws 
should be consistent with their views on which financial instruments are 
securities lends support to the position that, even without a specific 
exemption from the definition of security under the Company Act, swap 
contracts should not be considered securities for purposes of the 
Company Act. However, without guidance from the SEC, this may be a 
somewhat aggressive approach, and commodity pools may be better 
served in the absence of guidance from the SEC by taking the more 
conservative position that swap contracts should be analyzed as security 
futures are analyzed—that is, by looking to the financial instrument 
underlying the future (or, in this case, swap) contract. 
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The most conservative position, which is the opposite of the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act position that no swap contracts are 
securities, would be to consider all swap contracts securities under the 
Company Act; such a position, however, seems to contradict 
significantly with the approach taken by Congress with respect to swap 
contracts under the Securities Act and Exchange Act, as well as the 
approach taken with respect to futures contracts (i.e., not all futures 
contracts are treated as securities for purposes of the Company Act but 
only those based on underlying securities). The SEC could, absent 
specific action by Congress, address at least some of the ambiguity by 
expressing its intention to analyze swap contracts under the Company 
Act in the same way it analyses security futures. 
3. Currency Forward Contracts 
Many commodity pools trade not just currency futures contracts 
(traded on exchanges) but also currency forward contracts. The SEC, 
when presented with an opportunity to provide an opinion that currency 
forward contracts would not be treated as securities under the Company 
Act, declined to take such a position.168 The request for no-action relief, 
which the SEC declined to provide, argued that currency forward 
contracts, not being specifically mentioned by the definition of security 
contained in the Company Act, should not be securities (i.e., investment 
contracts) under the Howey test.169
 
 168. Currency Fund, SEC No-Action Letter. 
 Currency forward contracts are not 
treated as securities for purposes of either the Securities Act or the 
Exchange Act. Moreover, under the Company Act as well as the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act, currency futures contracts are not 
security futures, so the underlying financial instrument—a currency—is 
not treated for purposes of the definition of security future as a security; 
as such, currency forward contracts, which function in much the same 
manner as currency futures contracts, traded over the counter rather than 
on an exchange, should, for constancy, not be treated as securities for 
purposes of the Company Act. Finally, current practice by the 
commodity pool industry treats currency forward contracts as non-
securities, and, without a significant reason to alter this practice, the 
SEC should adopt it, providing certainty that it will not view currency 
forward contracts as securities under the Company Act. 
 169. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
When applied to commodity pools as opposed to traditional 
investment pools, the Company Act presents a variety of ambiguities 
that ought to be addressed by Congress, the SEC or both. These 
difficulties stand apart from any debate over the level of regulation 
appropriately placed on the activities of commodity pools because they 
are not about the extent to which the activities of commodity pools 
should be regulated, but whether the existing rules and regulations of the 
Company Act apply. Whether one seeks additional regulation of 
commodity pools (which, remember, are regulated under the CFTC 
jurisdiction aside from any residual regulation under the Company Act) 
or not, the ambiguities may be corrected without a widespread policy 
analysis of commodity pool regulation. Of course, depending on one’s 
position, one’s answer to how to resolve the difficulties may be 
different, but the need for resolution should be apparent regardless of 
one’s desired level of regulatory strictness. 
There are two primary difficulties. The first is the definition of 
primary engagement for the purposes of the Company Act’s definitions 
of investment company and the exemptions thereunder. In other words, 
whether an entity is engaged primarily in the business of trading in 
securities and thus, absent an exemption, an investment company or not, 
is a question not easily answered in some cases, particularly with regard 
to commodity pools because from an asset allocation perspective they 
may have a large allocation to securities (due to leverage and cash 
management). The second primary difficulty is the definition of security 
for purposes of the Company Act. Whether a financial instrument is a 
security under the Company Act, even if its status is clear under the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, may not be clear under the 
Company Act. 
Ultimately, Congress and the SEC should address the fundamental 
question of the application of the Company Act to non-traditional 
investment pools (such as commodity pools) by establishing a safe 
harbor for activity outside of being primarily engaged in the business of 
trading in securities. Additionally, Congress and the SEC should address 
the second fundamental question by establishing which financial 
instruments constitute securities for Company Act purposes. The 
simplest solution here would be to harmonize the definitions across the 
federal securities laws by stating that, for purposes of the Company Act, 
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“security” will be determined in the same way as it is for the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act, which is essentially this paper’s proposal. 
 
